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Abstract 
The agreement on the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is an important step to create an 
integrated banking system in Europe. In this article we look at the powers attributed to the ECB, 
from a legal perspective, in order to evaluate the SSM in the broader European architecture of 
banking supervision. We focus on three issues: the coexistence of more authorities with the same 
functions on a different perimeter of intermediaries in Europe, due to the UK decision to remain 
outside the SSM; the creation of a supervisory authority with weak regulatory powers (since these 
remain in the hands of European institutions and national legislators); and ambiguity over the 
competence to carry out early intervention powers. These issues should be addressed to increase the 
effectiveness of supervision. To this end, first we need an “umbrella authority” to coordinate 
supervision among all European countries (those that do and do not adhere to the SSM); this role 
could be played by the EBA. Second it is crucial to strengthen the powers of the ECB, in the 
regulatory field as well as for dealing with an impending crisis.  
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1 This paper is a revised version of the one presented at the Seminar “Verso la vigilanza unica in Europa”, organised by 
Banca d’Italia in Rome, 17 June 2013. I am grateful for very helpful comments by Stefano Cappiello and Roberto 
Rinaldi. 
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1. Introduction. The Banking Union in Europe: objectives and legal framework 
 
The decision to start a process that has as its ultimate goal the creation of a single banking 
system in Europe is a sign of discontinuity in the history of European banking regulation. The 
evolution of European legislation until June 2012 had as its primary objective the implementation 
of the “single market” of banking services in Europe that was initiated in 1993. The Directives on 
the banking sector, since the first ones in 1977, sought to harmonise rules in order to create a level 
playing field and to eliminate obstacles to competition within the territory of the European Union. 
The European Commission, with the “Road Map towards the Banking Union”, outlined in 
June 2012 (EC, 2012), recognises that further steps in the creation of a system of common rules for 
banks are important, but no longer sufficient.  
As highlighted by the ECB, there is a fundamental inconsistency in banking supervision being 
carried out at a national level in a currency area with a single monetary policy (ECB, 2012). There 
are macroeconomic rationales for a banking union: the fragmentation of the European banking 
system and tensions in bank funding conditions at the national level have impaired the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy and could contribute to negative loops between banking problems 
and sovereign funding. Under the current settings, fragility in national banking systems can be 
quickly transmitted to the national fiscal side and vice versa, triggering an adverse feedback loop 
between fiscal and banking problems. Therefore, price stability and financial stability are strongly 
interconnected (Visco, 2013).  
In order to reduce fragmentation and foster the creation of a unified banking system in 
Europe, the European Commission approved a reform based on three pillars: a single mechanism of 
supervision over banks, referred to as the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM); a single 
mechanism for the “resolution” of troubled banks, the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), and 
the harmonisation and strengthening of systems of deposit guarantee schemes. 
A strong political compromise on the first pillar has been achieved in a short time also 
because of the crisis of the Spanish banks and the difficulties of that country, due to the constraints 
of the public debt in dealing with it. The macroeconomic rational behind the Banking Union is 
confirmed by the Regulation approved by the European Council on the SSM. Article 1 and recitals 
1bis, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of its Regulation No. 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on 
the ECB concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions underline 
that the integrity of the single currency and the single market may be threatened by the 
fragmentation of the financial sector. 
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The regulatory construction is currently incomplete, however; the most important weakness is 
the lack of a binding and comprehensive agreement on sharing the fiscal burden among European 
Union countries in case of banking crisis (Micossi, 2013; Darvas & Silvia Merler, 2013). 
There is a deep discussion about the implementation of the second pillar of the Road Map of 
the Commission: the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). In March 2014 the European 
Parliament and the Council have reached a provisional agreement on the SRM and the Single 
Resolution Fund created by the intermediaries’ contributions that will be governed by two texts: a 
SRM regulation covering the main aspects of the mechanism and an intergovernmental agreement 
related to some specific aspects of the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) (On April 15, 2014 the 
European Parliament adopted the regulation proposal). These tools may allow crises of one or more 
intermediaries to be dealt with. In the event of a crisis of systemic importance, public intervention 
would be necessary, but there is no formal commitment by European countries on this point, except 
as provided in the latest revision of the agreement on the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)2 
that will operate within very strong limits. The agreement of 20 June 2013 allows for the direct 
recapitalisation of banks, but provides stringent eligibility criteria. There is an ex-ante limit for the 
amount of financial assistance available for a direct recapitalisation instrument of EUR 60 billion; 
this amount may not be sufficient if a systemic crisis occurs. Moreover, a significant part of the cost 
of the recapitalisation mechanism falls on the country of the troubled bank, reducing the possibility 
of breaking the vicious circle between banks’ fragility and the tension in the sovereign debt market. 
The lack of an agreement on this crucial issue, however, do not necessarily imply a sceptical 
judgment about the chances of success of the initial project. As has often happened in European 
history, the first step towards deeper integration is represented by a compromise limited to just a 
few topics. A Europe of “different speeds” was always recognised by the EU Treaties. In the 
genesis of the European Union there were the proposals of 1950 by the French Foreign Minister 
Robert Schuman in order to prevent the risk of a conflict between France and Germany concerning 
the coal and steel resources of the Ruhr and Saar. The proposal to place Franco-German coal and 
steel production under a common High Authority “whose decisions will bind France, Germany and 
the acceding countries” laid the foundations for economic unification. The agreement was the first 
concrete tool of a European federation indispensable for the preservation of peace. The Treaty 
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was signed two years later. The large 
investment pools made necessary by the commitment of member countries in the field of nuclear 
                                                
2 The ESM was established with an ad hoc treaty between the same countries participating in the Euro area, signed on 2 
February 2012, in order to preserve the financial stability of the Euro Area. 
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energy was the rationale for the start of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) in 
1957. That same year the European Economic Community was born.  
The past experience in the building of the European Union prompts us to be confident 
about the possibility of a gradual expansion of the commitments of member countries for the 
realisation of a unified banking system. The project on banking union is based on strong political 
grounds. It is not a “technical report”, produced by a study commission of experts. We do not 
believe that this phase can be seen in the light of “functionalist” theory. “Functionalism” holds that 
European integration is driven by “elites” and interest groups without the political consensus of 
national governments on the progress of European integration. According to this view, transferring 
some policy functions to the supranational level creates pressure for more integration. Europe 
integration is boosted by elites of “technocrats”, who support proposals that provide for the transfer 
of certain functions into the hands of European authorities to create pre-conditions, at a later time, 
for further transfers of sovereignty from Member States to the European institutions (“Jean 
Monnet’s Chain Reaction”) (Spolaore, 2013). 
The project defined by the European Commission in the Road Map in September 2012 
stands as an important convergence of the governments of the Euro Area countries, who are aware 
that it is the only possible solution to the problems arising from the global financial crisis. The 
political agreement preceded the technical solution in the preparation of the SSM regulation as well 
as in the draft regulation on the single mechanism for resolution of banking crises. The signing of 
the Treaty to set up the European Stability Mechanism shows the strong political interest of 
governments to support European integration, even if there remain disagreements on technical 
solutions and on the distribution of the burdens of the banking failures. 
We can conclude that the financial crisis has led to a new phase of European integration. The 
Treaties of Maastricht (1992), initiating the European Monetary Union, and Lisbon (2009) 
underlined the evolution of the European Community into the European Union.3 The evolution in 
the banking sector from the common market to a banking union is a natural consequence of those 
steps. The decision to create a banking union cannot be explained only in the light of the objectives 
of safeguarding the soundness of the banking system and financial stability; we regard the banking 
union as a path towards a more complex programme of reforms aimed at restoring confidence in the 
euro, which in the long-term seeks the attainment of economic and fiscal integration in Europe. 
 
*** 
                                                
3 With the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 the mechanism of “enhanced cooperation” was officially enshrined in the 
Treaties. 
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In this paper we focus on the first pillar, the SSM, as outlined in the Regulation No. 
1024/2013. We consider two issues that could pose obstacles to the reduction of the fragmentation 
of European banking and might threaten financial stability. First, the UK has ruled out the 
possibility of joining the Single Supervisory System; consequently, a significant part of European 
intermediaries are out of the SSM. Second, although a political compromise on a single system for 
the management of banking crisis has been reached, some uncertainties concerning the 
implementation of the new rules still remain. 
These two factors led to sub-optimal solutions in the definitions of the new supervisory 
architecture in Europe. We shall first address the sub-optimal solutions of the current agreement, 
suggesting some corrections. In more detail, we try to identify the instruments that are already in 
place in the European Union regulatory system, which could be useful to streamline and strengthen 
the functioning of the SSM to ensure integration and stability of the banking system. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the SSM 
institutional framework. Section 3 analyses the issue of the coexistence of many supervisory 
authorities over banks in Europe, comparing the new European institutional framework with the 
experience of the United States. Section 4 discusses the problems arising from the lack of strong 
regulatory powers in the ECB. Section 5 deals with the need to concentrate in European 
institutions the remit for early intervention supervisory powers. Section 6 provides some 
conclusions. 
 
2. The structure of the supervisory model 
 
Council Regulation No. 1024/2013 establishes a Single Supervisory Mechanism among Euro 
Area countries. The mechanism is open to other European Member States wishing to “opt-in” with 
an agreement of close cooperation. The Euro Area countries have chosen to confer on the ECB 
prudential supervision tasks as set out in Article 127(6) of the TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union). Despite the fact that this legislative base seems to allow the attribution only 
of “specific tasks” on supervisory policy, the Regulation conferred on the ECB the entire set of 
instruments of prudential supervision (Capriglione, 2013; Guarracino, 2013). In particular, the remit 
of the ECB will include controls on requirements needed to access the banking sector (authorisation 
to carry out banking activities and assessment of applications for the acquisition and disposal of 
qualifying holdings in credit institutions); powers to ensure compliance with prudential 
requirements (capital adequacy, large exposure limits, liquidity and leverage); powers to ensure 
compliance with regulation on the internal control system (corporate governance arrangements, 
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including fit and proper requirements for the persons responsible for the management of credit 
institutions, risk management processes, internal control mechanisms, remuneration policies and 
practices, and effective internal capital adequacy assessment processes); tasks to carry out 
supervisory reviews and stress tests in order to determine whether arrangements, strategies and 
processes put in place by credit institutions ensure a sound management and coverage of their risks; 
powers to impose on credit institutions specific additional own funds requirements, specific 
publication requirements, liquidity requirements; investigatory powers (the ECB may require banks 
to provide all necessary information in order to carry out its tasks and may conduct all necessary 
on-site inspections); powers to carry out supervision on a consolidated basis and to participate in 
supplementary supervision of a financial conglomerate; tasks to carry out supervisory reviews in 
relation to recovery plans and early intervention to prevent financial stress or failure, excluding any 
resolution powers. 
To identify the boundaries of the ECB powers, the central bank has a clear mandate to 
perform all tasks of prudential regulation in “good times”. It is less clear what the ECB’s powers are 
in “bad times”, e.g. in a pre-crisis situation. We will examine this problem in more depth in Section 
5. 
The ECB is mandated carry out its tasks within a single supervisory mechanism composed of 
the ECB and national authorities. It shall be responsible for the effective and consistent functioning 
of the SSM. Both the ECB and national competent authorities shall be subject to a duty of 
cooperation in good faith and an obligation to exchange information. 
The ECB will not carry out prudential supervision on the entire banking system of the Euro 
Area. The banks within the participating countries will be divided into two categories: “less 
significant banks” and “banks of significant relevance”. The significance is based on certain 
criteria: the size, the importance for the economy of the EU or any participating Member State, and 
relevance of cross-border activities. Moreover there will fall within the remit of the ECB banks that 
have requested or received financial assistance from the ESM and the three most significant credit 
institutions in each of the participating Member States notwithstanding they do not meet the 
conditions to be considered “of significant relevance”. 
With respect to “less significant banks”, supervisory decisions will be taken by national 
competent authorities. With respect to “banks of significant relevance”, national competent 
authorities shall be responsible for assisting the ECB with the preparation and implementation of 
any acts relating to the ECB tasks. 
The ECB will adopt a detailed framework for the practical modalities of supervisory 
cooperation within the SSM, specifying operational arrangements. There are some risks associated 
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with the structure of the SSM. In the initial period the main problem could be that the ECB will 
have inadequate resources, especially in a lack of personnel with professional expertise in the 
banking supervision field. In this case the SSM could be excessively dependent on national 
authorities; if national authorities retain real power they may favour national banking systems, with 
unclear accountability. 
A more relevant risk comes from the operational structure outlined: in the European Council 
agreement, the ECB’s regulatory powers are limited to operational aspects. As set out in Article 5 
Regulation No. 1024/2013, the ECB shall apply all relevant European Union law and where this is 
composed of Directives, the national legislation transposing those Directives. The ECB shall adopt 
guidelines and recommendations subject to and in compliance with the relevant European Union 
law. The ECB may adopt regulations only to the extent necessary to organise or specify the 
modalities for carrying out those tasks. If the ECB has to apply national legislation there is a risk 
that the new system would not be able to solve the current fragmentation of the European banking 
systems. I will deal with these issues in Section 4. 
Council Regulation No. 1024/2013 establishes detailed supervisory internal governance. It 
proposes the establishment of a Supervisory Board within the ECB. The Governing Council of the 
ECB, which is responsible for monetary policy, would remain formally responsible for making 
decisions prepared by the Supervisory Board. The Supervisory Board carries out preparatory 
supervisory tasks and proposes draft decisions to the Governing Council which formally adopts 
these decisions. This complex internal governance has been established because the European 
Council wanted to limit the problem of conflict of interest between the monetary policy task and the 
banking supervisory task. This is reason why the task of supervision has been delegated to an 
independent internal body of the ECB. However, the Supervisory Board cannot have “decision-
making powers”. Under the Treaty, the Governing Council is the only deciding internal body of the 
ECB. 
As underlined before, the regulation is based on the idea of creating a comprehensive 
supervisory system for the entire European banking market. The single market for banking services 
started in 1993, based on the principles of “minimum harmonisation”, “mutual recognition” and the 
“single passport”. This allowed a “credit institution” legally established in one Member State to 
establish itself and provide services in other Member States without any further authorisation 
requirements. Therefore home country authorities are responsible for the prudential supervision of 
foreign established branches (“home country control”). The efficacy of the new SSM could be 
hampered if some European countries fail to join the mechanism. This is the rationale behind the 
decision of the European Council to allow non-Euro Member States to opt in to the SSM, the “pre-
8 
 
ins”, and to encourage their participation. The Council agreement grants the “pre-ins” participation 
in the Supervisory Board, through the representatives of their national authorities. Considering that 
non-Euro countries cannot be represented on the Governing Council, Regulation No. 1024 provides 
pre-ins with some procedural safeguards in case the Governing Council objects to or amends a draft 
decision of the Supervisory Board. Eventually, in case of disagreement, the Member State can 
request the ECB to terminate the close cooperation with immediate effect.  
Even if most of the European Member States will adhere to the SSM, besides the 17 Euro 
countries, the decision of the UK to “opt out” could not be considered irrelevant. The UK banking 
system is of crucial importance because intermediaries established in that country have relevant 
dimensions compared with the European financial market (Ferran & Babis, 2013; Darvas & Wolff, 
2013). As the location for an important part of the EU’s financial services business, the UK national 
strategies in the banking supervision field are closely tied up with those that will be adopted by the 
ECB as the prudential supervisory authority of the Euro Area countries (Capriglione, 2013). I will 
address this problem in Section 3. 
 
3. More authority with the same functions in the European banking single market: insights 
from a comparison with the US system 
 
In the new European banking supervision more than one authority will be competent to carry 
out, for prudential purposes, the same tasks on a different perimeter of intermediaries: banks 
established in the UK will be supervised by the authority of that country (which currently is the 
Prudential Supervisory Authority within the Bank of England); “less significant banks” of Euro 
Area countries will be supervised by national competent authorities; “banks of significant 
relevance” established in the Euro Area will be supervised by the ECB. 
This situation is not dissimilar from the one built up in the United States, where there is a 
system of multiple regulators with tasks partly overlapping. We must of course take into account the 
differences due to the fact that the US is a federal state; and while Europe can no longer be 
considered a mere free trade area, but a “community of law”,4 it is far from being a federal system. 
The supervisory system with a plurality of authorities with different tasks has not been 
abandoned in the US even after the reform approved in 2010 in response to the financial crisis – the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act. This reform was not a simplification. It did 
not reduce the number of financial authorities, but merely entailed a reorganisation of the 
                                                
4 “A community based on the rule of law”, as indicated by the European Court of Justice of 23 April 1986: Case 294/83, 
Les Verts v. Parliament. 
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supervisory system. The only authority abolished was the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) whose 
responsibilities were distributed among other authorities. The OTS was created in 1989 after the 
savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s and specialised in monitoring the safety and soundness of 
federal saving associations and their holding companies. 
The US system has many weaknesses. Numerous authors have expressed critical opinions on 
the efficacy of a supervisory system of multiple regulators with overlapping jurisdictions (Greene, 
2011, Masera, 2010; Ferrarini & Chiodini, 2012). The US government tried to improve the 
supervisory architecture but was forced to take into account the strong political objections that 
would have been raised against a fundamental simplification in the number of authorities. The US 
reform provides useful suggestions for Europe.  
In the US there is a “dual banking system” in which each intermediary is subject to multiple 
controls. Banks can be state-chartered or federally-chartered (national banks); some special 
categories of banks, like thrifts or credit unions, can be state or federally chartered. Each credit 
institution is subject to supervision by its chartering authority, state or federal, and in addition is 
subject to at least one federal “primary regulator”, a federal authority responsible for prudential 
purposes and for ensuring compliance with federal banking law. Primary regulators are the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(FED) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). An important feature of the system 
is that all of these institutions, because their deposits are covered by FDIC deposit insurance, are 
also subject to the FDIC’s regulatory authority (the only credit institutions beyond the remit of 
FDIC are “credit unions” that have a distinct deposit insurance fund at federal level). The FDIC 
was created in 1933 to provide insurance to small depositors. It is an independent agency that, as 
well as insuring the deposits, examines individual institutions and issues regulations for all 
insured depository institutions to monitor and enforce safety and soundness, manages the 
receivership and plays an important role in the liquidation process. The fund is used for 
supporting failing institutions too. The Dodd-Frank Act expanded the FDIC’s powers in 
liquidating troubled financial institutions, banks and other intermediaries, which are designated as 
systemically important.  
In the US there are also many interagency task forces for coordination and data sharing 
among different supervisors. These are named the “regulatory umbrella”. Three interagency 
organisations have permanent status: the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), the Federal 
Financial Institution Examinations Council (FFIEC), and the President’s Working Group on 
Financial Markets (PWG). For our purposes the FSOC is the most interesting, created in 2010 with 
the Dodd-Frank Act. The Council is chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury. Other voting 
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members are the heads of the agencies competent for regulating and supervising the financial sector 
(therefore FED, FDIC and OCC are voting members). The FSOC has no direct supervisory 
responsibilities of financial institutions, nor regulatory power. Its tasks include identifying and 
monitoring systemic risks, proposing to Congress regulatory changes to promote stability, 
competitiveness and efficiency, facilitating the exchange of information between financial 
authorities, providing a forum for the resolution of jurisdictional disputes among council members. 
In addition, the FSOC may designate a financial institution (bank or non-bank) as relevant from the 
systemic point of view, with the consequence that it will be subject to a supervisory regime more 
stringent than that required for other intermediaries. 
From the overview of the US supervisory architecture, after the Dodd-Frank reform, 
notwithstanding its excessive complexity and cumbersome regulations, we can identify some strong 
points: the crucial role in the supervisory system of the FDIC having powers of intervention during 
the crisis and pre-crisis over all systemically relevant financial institutions; and the need for a 
powerful regulatory umbrella in systems of multiple regulators with overlapping jurisdiction. 
We believe that in the European system there is one authority that can exercise a coordination 
role effectively: the European Banking Authority. The EBA could be considered an “umbrella” 
authority, due not only to its strong regulatory remit but also to the capacity, provided by the 
European regulation (Regulation. No. 1093/2010 of 24 November 2010), to mediate and settle 
disagreements in cross-border situations between competent authorities with binding effect (Article 
19); to participate actively in the development and coordination of effective and consistent recovery 
and resolution plans (Article 25), procedures in emergency situations and preventive measures to 
minimise the systemic impact of any failure, especially of cross-border banking groups (Article 18); 
and to ensure a coherent functioning of colleges of supervisors (Article 21). Moreover, Regulation 
No. 1022/2013, enacted to ensure a balance in the EBA decision-making structures between the 
Euro Area and other Member States, strengthens its “coordination role”.5 
Based on the current legislation, the EBA is the most appropriate actor to close the gaps in the 
banking supervision at European level and to achieve a fruitful negotiation on supervisory practices 
with British authorities (see IMF, 2013; Ferrarini & Chiodini, 2012). 
 
                                                
5 Regulation (EU) No. 1022/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 amending 
Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) as 
regards the conferral of specific tasks on the European Central Bank pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) No. 
1024/2013. 
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4. Splitting supervision into regulatory function and controls on the banking activity in 
order to monitor sound and prudent management (authorisations, collecting and 
examining data etc.) 
 
The scheme proposed by the Regulation No. 1024/2013 provides a clear distinction 
between “regulation” and “supervision”; they are intended as different tasks that could be carried 
out by different subjects (Wymeersch, 2012). This approach is a novelty that has not been 
experienced by the legislation of any one country so far. Actually, in some jurisdictions, as in the 
UK, from a terminological point of view, the word “regulation” is even used as substitute for 
“supervision”. 
The regulation of banks remains essentially a competence of national laws, implementing EU 
rules, as pointed out in several provisions of Regulation No. 1024/2013. According to Article 4(3), 
the ECB  
 
shall apply all relevant Union law, and where this Union Law is composed of directives, the 
national legislation transposing those directives. Where the relevant Union law is composed 
of Regulations and where currently those regulations explicitly grant options for Member 
States, the ECB shall apply also the national legislation exercising these options. To that 
effect, the ECB shall adopt guidelines and recommendations, and take decisions subject to 
and in compliance with the relevant Union law.  
 
Moreover the ECB shall be subject to “binding regulatory and implementing standards 
developed by the EBA”. 
Under this rule it is clear that the ECB has no regulatory powers over banking activities. In 
carrying out its supervisory tasks the ECB shall apply EU laws and national provisions 
implementing EU rules. The ECB may adopt regulations “only to the extent necessary to organise 
or specify the modalities for the carrying out of those tasks…”. It is therefore a regulatory power 
limited to “self-organisation” of the exercise of ECB powers. The most important example of “self-
organisation” rules is the “framework” that the ECB shall adopt (and make public) in consultation 
with national authorities “to organise the practical arrangements” relating to the cooperation within 
the SSM (Article 6(7)) (a draft regulation was published for consultation by the ECB in February 
2014). 
The picture is less clear if we continue reading the same Article 4(3), where it is stated that 
“before adopting a regulation, the ECB shall conduct open public consultations and analyse the 
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potential related costs and benefits”. The need for a public consultation, normally required for the 
adoption of rules in the proper sense, i.e. provisions binding on third parties, suggests that in the 
remit of the ECB there are also regulatory powers. As the first part of the same article (Article 4(3)) 
does not seem to assign such powers to the ECB, except to the extent necessary to self-organise the 
supervisory function, it is unclear what the source of these powers is. Thus we can conclude that 
Regulation 1024/2013 does not confer on the ECB a formal regulatory power. The central bank may 
just issue guidelines and other non-binding provisions. 
This division between regulation and supervision is particularly dangerous for the proper 
functioning of the new SSM. Despite the long process of harmonisation and the efforts made by 
directives and guidelines of the European authorities, especially the EBA, there remain important 
differences in the rules and supervisory approaches between Member States. 
Up to now the differences were mainly due to the provision of EU directives that left 
discretionary options to Member States in transposing EU law. On this issue, the recent European 
legislation on capital requirements introduced important innovations. The new regulatory 
framework replaces the Capital Requirements Directive with two different legislative instruments 
(Capital Requirements IV package – CRD IV): a directive governing access to deposit-taking 
activities (Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 26 June 2013 – 
CRD) and a regulation establishing the prudential requirements (Regulation No 575/2013 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 - CRR). The regulation is directly 
applicable; this means that it will take immediate effect in all Member States without any further 
action on the part of the national authorities. This should reduce divergences between European 
legal systems that result from the transposition of directives. The new rules cancel a large number 
of national options and discretions. They allow Member States to apply stricter requirements only 
where these are justified by national circumstances, needed on the grounds of financial stability or 
because of a bank’s specific risk profile. 
The new rules concerning “prudential supervision” may be regarded as a “single rule book”, 
but we should consider that even the CRR allows some options to Member States in its 
implementation. Moreover whatever the letter of the law, different authorities in different EU 
jurisdictions can adopt different approaches to perform their supervisory duties. The former 
CEBS (Committee of European Banking Supervisors, which has been replaced by the EBA) in its 
documents made a clear distinction between “option” and “discretion” in implementing EU 
directives. An “option” refers to a situation in which “competent authorities or Member States are 
given the choice on how to comply with a given provision, selecting from a range of alternatives 
set forth in Community legislation”, whereas a “discretion” refers to a situation in which 
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“competent authorities or Member States are given a choice as to whether to implement, or not 
implement, a given provision” (Guidelines on Supervisory Disclosure, January 2010). The term 
“discretion” means that the supervisory authorities have a choice as to how they go about 
performing their day-to-day supervisory duties. “When directives refer to the need for an 
institution to obtain a competent authority’s approval or authorisation for various purposes, such 
authorisation or approval might be discretionary, but it does not constitute a national discretion in 
the sense described above” (CEBS Guidelines on Supervisory Disclosure, January 2010). The 
exercise of this discretion (as opposed to a “national discretion”) can lead to different regulatory 
outcomes notwithstanding the wording of the legislation relied upon being the same or similar in 
different Member States.6 
Studies and research reports on behalf of the EU Commission (see the De Larosière Report, 
2009, and Liikanen Report, 2012) have shown that in Europe banking authorities have adopted 
different approaches to banking supervision. One may refer to the regulatory proposals, in 
response to the global financial crisis, on “structural measures”, i.e. institutional separation 
between banks that carry out traditional banking business (collecting deposits and lending 
activity) and intermediaries engaging in proprietary trading and other securities activity 
(Gambacorta & van Rixtel, 2013). There have been various initiatives in the US and in some 
European countries. The “Volckler rule” is contained in the Dodd-Frank Act 2010 in the US; the 
proposals of the Vickers Commission have been implemented in the UK with the Banking 
Reform Bill of 2013; the Liikanen Report (2012) proposed for banking groups a mandatory 
separation of certain trading activities from the deposit bank (on January 2014, the European 
Commission adopted a proposal for a regulation based on the Liikanen report). The rationale for 
this proposal is to insulate certain types of financial activities, that need a special protection 
(deposit taking), or are important for the real economy (loans to firms), from risks that could 
originate in “less important activities”, such as investment banking business. Beyond the basic 
idea, the reforms present some similarities, but they differ in scope and in the severity of the rules. 
Moreover the structural reform proposals are far from being considered a common standard for 
European countries. 
The regulatory differences between European countries are not limited to important topics 
such as those related to structural measures. Member States would like to maintain the styles of 
supervision they have adopted up to now. The reasons for national resistance to change are various. 
                                                
6 This point is recognised by the CEBS Guidelines on Supervisory Disclosure – revised, dated January 2010 
(Introduction, paragraph 2) when citing the “The Revised Framework for International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards” (Basel II agreement) to the effect that “the supervision of banks is not an exact 
science, and therefore, discretionary elements within the supervisory review process are inevitable”. 
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In some cases, governments would like to protect the competitiveness of their national 
intermediaries and national financial system; in some other cases, the conservative approach refers 
to the national regulatory framework (which could even be subject to constitutional limits) and 
administrative traditional culture. 
The different approaches to supervision led to regulatory arbitrage, giving a competitive 
advantage to intermediaries established in countries with a “light touch approach” in banking 
supervision (such as the UK, before the financial crisis; see FSA, 2009). 
The regulatory differences could have even more problematic consequences in the perspective 
of SSM. There may be difficulties for the ECB to adopt a common standard in the exercise of 
supervision due to the legislative constraint stated in the regulation to implement the “national 
rules”. This situation could undermine the ECB’s capacity to carry out its task, complying with one 
of the key principles stated in the first article of the proposed regulation on SSM: “… duty of care 
for the unity and integrity of the internal market based on equal treatment of credit institutions with 
a view to preventing regulatory arbitrage” (Regulation No. 1024/2013, Article 1(1)) (Wymeersch 
2014; D’Ambrosio, 2013)7. Moreover different supervisory approaches could hinder the ECB’s 
oversight of cross-border groups (Ferrarini & Chiarella, 2013). 
Without common supervisory standards the possibility of different treatment of intermediaries 
is amplified by the complex procedural system adopted for the SSM’s functioning. Although the 
ECB shall be responsible for the effective functioning and consistent supervision mechanism, the 
SSM is composed by the ECB and national competent authorities. Under Article 4 of the proposed 
regulation on SSM, national authorities shall be responsible for assisting the ECB with the 
preparation and implementation of any acts relating to the ECB’s prudential supervisory tasks 
having regard to credit institutions “of significant relevance”. On the contrary, with respect to “less 
significant banks” supervisory decisions are adopted by national competent authorities. The ECB 
shall issue regulations, guidelines or general instructions to national competent authorities. If 
necessary, to ensure consistent application of high supervisory standards, the ECB may decide to 
exercise directly itself all the relevant powers also with respect to “less significant banks”. The 
decisions have to be taken after consulting with national competent authorities or upon request by a 
national competent authority (Article 6(5)(b)). 
The relationship between national authorities and the ECB cannot be compared to that 
between the European Commission and national authorities in the antitrust field. The TFUE 
                                                
7 According to Article 1, par. 1 of the SSM regulation: “This Regulation confers on the ECB specific tasks concerning 
policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, with a view to contributing to the safety and 
soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system within the Union and each Member State, with 
full regard and duty of care for the unity and integrity of the internal market based on equal treatment of credit 
institutions with a view to preventing regulatory arbitrage”. 
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established a clear primacy of EU law. National legislation may apply to agreements impeding 
competition, alleged abuses of dominant position and concentrations that do not fall within the 
scope of the EU. Moreover in the antitrust field both the European Commission and national 
authorities apply the same discipline. Under Article 1(4) of Law 287/90, Italian legal provisions 
on antitrust shall be interpreted in accordance with the principles of EU law. The regime for 
enforcing European competition law provides a decentralised decision-making system, in 
accordance with the “subsidiarity principle” (Article 5 of the European Treaty). This case is 
different from that outlined by Regulation No. 1024/2013 for the ECB oversight of credit 
institutions “of significant relevance”. In the latter, the law does not provide a “decentralisation” 
of powers enforcing the rules. National authorities have only the duty to carry out the 
investigation and the implementation phases of the administrative process. National supervisors 
are considered as an integral part of the SSM in the Regulation No. 1024/2013 (Wymeersch 
2014). The decision-making responsibility remains within the remit of the BCE, but the latter has 
to apply the “national legislation” implementing EU rules. 
As previously underlined, the absence of a common regulatory framework could lead to 
undesirable outcomes: different treatment of Euro Area credit institutions and problems in the 
cooperation between ECB and national authorities. 
One way to try to overcome these problems is to support the setting-up of “supervisory 
teams” of national competent authorities, as provided in Article 25(2) of the proposed regulation. 
The teams, taking supervisory actions regarding a credit institution, could lead to a “common 
culture” in the supervisory field in the long run. 
To accelerate convergence in the supervisory approaches we need to confer more powers on 
the ECB to produce common standards in order to perform its tasks properly and to be independent 
in its decisions from the influence of national authorities. The legal instruments could be 
recommendations and guidelines, implementing the new prudential regulation contained in the CRR 
regulation. We should consider that many articles of the new CRR confer discretionary powers in 
applying the rules; for instance, the CRR gives to competent authorities the power to derogate a 
rule, to waive a provision or to exercise an option. The ECB, by the end of 2014, will be the 
“competent authority” for a large number of European banks; the power to exercise these options is 
in the remit of the ECB if we do not interpret the notion of “competent authorities” as limited to that 
of the “national authorities”. According to the wording of the CRR (Article 4(40)), “‘competent 
authority’ means a public authority or body officially recognised by national law, which is 
empowered by national law to supervise institutions as part of the supervisory system in operation 
in the Member State concerned”. The ECB will be the public authority empowered to exercise the 
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supervision over banks “of significant relevance” by the national laws of Member States adhering to 
the SSM when Regulation No. 1024/2013 enters into force. Such an interpretation is confirmed by 
recital 34 of Regulation No. 1024 which provides that the ECB should apply the material rules 
relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions; those rules are composed of the relevant 
Union law, in particular Regulations or Directives. Where the relevant material rules are laid down 
in Regulations and in areas where those “Regulations explicitly grant options to member States the 
ECB should apply the national legislation exercising these options”. The national legislation is not 
binding on the ECB if options are “available only to competent or designated authorities.” 
Therefore, the Regulation identifies the ECB as the “competent authority” according to the relevant 
Union Law (D’Ambrosio, 2013). 
Increasing the ECB’s regulatory capacity could lead also to a new equilibrium decision 
system among Member States in the EBA (Lener & Rulli, 2013), reinforcing the possibility of 
reaching an agreement on a bilateral negotiation between the ECB and the UK authorities. 
 
5. The need to concentrate pre-crisis powers in the ECB’s competence 
 
The split of the supervisory function into different tasks, regulation and controls on the banks’ 
management, falling within the remit of different authorities, creates serious problems in pre-crisis 
situations, because the regulatory framework in this field is not well defined. Moreover the 
misalignment between the European Union supervision of banks and the national treatment of 
banks in the resolution proceedings could hinder the capacity of the ECB to act promptly to avoid 
the difficulties of one large bank being transmitted to other intermediaries, affecting the whole 
financial system (De Grauwe, 2013). 
The rules on banking crisis management have been recently harmonised. The EU Directive 
2001/24/EC on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions that have their headquarters 
in one Member State and branches in other Member States, while affirming the principles of unity 
and universality of the procedures, did not harmonise them. The directive established a mutual 
recognition of national measures that are fully effective throughout the European Union territory 
without any further formalities. The proposal for a directive providing a common framework for the 
recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms has been adopted by the 
European Parliament on 15 April 2014. Moreover, the Commission made a proposal for a 
Regulation on a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and a Single Bank Resolution Fund to 
complete the banking union among Euro Area countries (Presidency compromise, dated 17 
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December 2013 adopted by the EU Parliament April 15, 2014).8 Some technical and political 
obstacles to the adoption of the proposal have been overcome with the provisional agreement 
reached in March 2014 by the European Parliament and the Council. The proposal creates a new 
European agency designed pursuant to Article 114 of TFEU, the Single Resolution Board. The 
board will share the responsibility of resolution tasks with the ECB, the Commission and the 
Council. The SRM regulation entrusts the ECB with the power to activate the resolution upon 
assessing “whether a credit institution is failing or likely to fail and whether there is no reasonable 
prospect that any alternative private sector or supervisory action would prevent its failure within a 
reasonable timeframe” (recital 16 of the proposed Regulation). The ECB shall communicate that 
assessment to the Commission and the Board. The Resolution Board after assessing if there is a 
systemic threat and if there is no private alternative solution will then adopt a “resolution scheme” 
including the relevant resolution tools and any use of the Fund. Before the Board adopts its 
decision, the Commission will assess its compliance with State aid rules. The Commission is 
responsible for assessing the discretionary aspects of the decision of the Board and endorsing or 
objecting to the resolution scheme. The Council could object the Commission’s decision if there is 
no public interest in resolving the bank or under certain circumstances involving the use of the 
Single Fund.9 
In this legal framework two problems may arise. First, the lack of a clear and uniform 
definition of “early intervention measures” at European level could lead to different treatments of 
Euro Area banks. The ECB will not have the same set of tools to react to a bank in distress in all the 
Euro Area countries, due to the lack of harmonisation in this field. Second, when the legal 
framework on bank resolution is in place, there will be a plurality of authorities with overlapping 
powers in some circumstances. This could slow down the reactions of authorities that are needed to 
prevent panic. 
                                                
8 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing uniform rules and a uniform 
procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution 
Mechanism and a Single Bank Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council (2013/0253).  
9 This complicated system of tasks and responsibilities has been chosen due to the urgency of putting the SRM in place 
within a reasonable period of time, considering the SSM will start to operate within one year. Other solutions entailed a 
change of the Treaty. The current proposals have been scrutinised by the legal service of the European Council which 
concludes that some of the provisions conferring resolution powers on the Board “need to be further detailed in order to 
exclude that a wide margin of discretion is entrusted to the Board, unless the legislator decides to involve in the exercise 
of those powers an institution of the Union vested with executive competences” according to the Meroni doctrine (Case 
9-56, Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche, SpA v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community. 
Judgment of the Court of 13 June 1958 (Jur523, 7 October 2013). On this point, however, we must take into account the 
innovative decision of the European Court of Justice of 22 January 2014 (Case C-270/12, United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union) on the powers conferred on 
the ESMA under Article 28 of Regulation No. 236/2012, finding that these powers “are precisely delineated and 
amenable to judicial review in the light of the objectives established by the delegating authority”, thus they “comply 
with the requirements laid down in Meroni v High Authority”. 
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To better understand the first point it is useful to analyse the ECB’s “early intervention 
powers”. Regulation No. 1024/2013 on SSM assigns to the ECB important tasks in pre-crisis 
situations with regard to “banks of significant relevance”. According to Article 4(1)(k), the ECB has 
the exclusive power to carry out  
 
supervisory tasks in relation to recovery plans, and early intervention where a credit 
institution or group in relation to which the ECB is the consolidating supervisor, does not 
meet or is likely to breach the applicable prudential requirements and, only in the cases 
explicitly stipulated by relevant Union law for competent authorities, structural changes 
required from credit institutions to prevent financial stress or failure.  
 
The only exceptions are the powers of resolution. The ambiguity of the provision is mitigated 
by Article 16 of the Regulation which contains a list of measures that the ECB shall have “at an 
early stage to address relevant problems”, where there is a breach of the rule regarding sound and 
prudent management. Among these measures there is the power to require banks to hold their own 
funds in excess of the minimum capital requirements, to restrict or limit their business, to require 
the institution to limit the managers’ remuneration, and to remove at any time from the management 
body of credit institutions members who do not fulfil the requirements set out in the banking 
supervision regulation. 
This list cannot be considered exhaustive. Some useful hints to identify the notion of early 
intervention measures are given in the Capital Requirements Directive (Dir. 2006/48 and 2006/49, 
now replaced by the Capital Requirements – CRD IV package: Directive 2013/36/EU and 
Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013). According to Articles 102–104 of the Directive, competent 
authorities shall require an institution to take the “necessary measures” at an early stage to address 
relevant problems when the institution does not meet the requirements of CRD requirements or the 
competent authorities have evidence that the institution is likely to breach the requirements within 
the following 12 months. “Necessary measures” are identified through a long list that describes the 
powers of authorities. The list includes the power to require institutions to hold own funds in excess 
of the minimum requirements; to require the reinforcement of the arrangements, processes, 
mechanisms and strategies implemented; to require institutions to present a plan to restore 
compliance with supervisory requirements; to require institutions to apply a specific provisioning 
policy or treatment of assets in terms of own funds requirements; to restrict or limit the business, 
operations or network of institutions or to request the divestment of activities that pose excessive 
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risks to the soundness of an institution; to require institutions to use net profits to strengthen own 
funds; and to restrict or prohibit distributions or interest payments by an institution to shareholders. 
The measures contained in the list established by Article 104 in large part correspond to those 
set out in Article 16 of the SSM Regulation, but one can assume that all the powers described as 
Articles 102–104 of the CRD directive fall within the competence of the SSM. None of these 
powers can be considered as a “resolution power” which, as mentioned, is certainly a power outside 
the remit of the SSM. 
The intervention powers of the ECB, however, cannot be considered confined to measures 
included in this extensive list. Member States implementing the provision of a directive, such as 
Articles 102–104 of the CRD IV, may add additional powers to the list of “early intervention 
powers” and the ECB is granted the same powers that national authorities have. To understand this 
point better, an example from Italian experience is useful. According the Italian Banking Law, the 
Bank of Italy has a wide range of instruments for corrective action, such as to convene the directors, 
require intermediaries to adopt corrective measures on their organisation, risk or capital, impose 
strengthening of the organisation or restrictions on its operation, and prohibit it from carrying out 
certain transactions. Furthermore, the Bank of Italy may prohibit banks authorised in Italy from 
undertaking new transactions or order the closure of branches for violation of laws, regulations or 
bylaws governing their activities, for management irregularities. As a matter of urgency the Bank of 
Italy may provide for one of its own officers to take over the provisional management of the bank; 
this provisional management may not last for more than two months. In Italy the supervisory 
authority makes the proposal to the Minister of the Treasury to issue a decree of “special 
administration” of the bank. 
The Italian case shows that just a part of the powers granted by Italian law to the supervisory 
authorities in the phase of “early intervention” reproduce those identified in the regulation in CRD 
IV. This could lead to a different treatment of the banks subject to supervision by the ECB. 
Moreover, if the ECB has to apply national rules and the “early intervention powers” are not 
regulated exhaustively by the specific banking laws, but by commercial or bankruptcy laws too, the 
ECB could face severe problems in using these powers in an effective manner. The harmonisation of 
rules regarding “early intervention powers” by the European directive becomes more urgent than it 
was in the past when this phase was in the remit of national authorities. To some extent the 
compromise reached in June 2013 on the proposal of a directive establishing a framework for the 
recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms (EU Council 11148/1/13, 28 June 
2013, adopted by the EU Parliament on 15 April 2014) harmonises some crisis prevention measures, 
such as the appointment of one or more special managers to a bank with a deteriorating financial 
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situation or that has committed serious irregularities (Article 24 of the proposal), but we believe it is 
necessary to make a stronger effort to reach a deeper integration of European laws on this point. 
The second problem refers to overlapping powers between the ECB and the Resolution Board 
set up by the SRM regulation (Micossi S., Bruzzone G. & Carmassi J. 2013). The Board has to 
intervene when “a bank is failing or likely to fail” but even the ECB could adopt a broad range of 
corrective and extraordinary intervention measures in the early intervention phase. Moreover, in the 
ordinary supervisory activity carried out by national authorities there is a close link between the 
evaluation process and the correction phase. The latter is a result of the evaluation and consists of the 
determination of the measures appropriate to the characteristics of the anomalies found. There is a 
graduation of the forms of intervention of supervisory authorities; the range of interventions goes 
from “preventive measures”, such as warnings, to “corrective measures”, such as changes in the 
internal organisation. “Extraordinary measures”, such as restriction on operations or prohibition from 
carrying out certain transactions, are usually taken in a subsequent phase. There is a continuous line 
from “preventive measures”, “corrective measures” and “extraordinary measure” (Boccuzzi, 2011). 
The extreme form of intervention consists in removing the shareholders’ control over the company (as 
happens in special administration or liquidation procedures generally regulated by bankruptcy laws). 
These considerations suggest that the key role in the bank pre-crisis phase should be played 
by the supervisory authorities, the ECB or the national competent authorities (Carmassi, Di Noia & 
Micossi, 2012; Micossi S., Bruzzone G. & Carmassi J. 2013). This is consistent with the legal 
framework designed by the SSM regulation. However it is important to avoid the ECB becoming 
involved in the responsibility for decisions adopted to resolve a failed bank, considering that 
currently the burden of the crisis still falls at the national level (Nieto & Garcia, 2012). The solution 
could be to identify clearly two different phases: the pre-crisis phase and the resolution phase. The 
latter starts when there is a declaration of the ECB that the bank is no longer viable. This could split 
the technical responsibilities from those with political features10 (ECB, 2013). 
 
5.1. Emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) 
 
A fundamental instrument to protect financial stability along with oversight, crisis resolution 
procedures and deposit insurance, is “emergency liquidity assistance” (ELA). The “lender of last 
                                                
10 During the ECB press conference in October 2013, the president, Mario Draghi, answering a question on the SRM, 
saying that “…we view the two phases, namely that of assessing the non-viability of a certain bank in question and that 
of deciding which action should be undertaken as clearly separate tasks. The SSM would take care of the first phase and 
the SRM would take care of the second. Also the draft proposal on this very same topic gives the ECB the status of a 
voting member. The ECB believes that it should only be an observer, just to make sure that two phases are completely 
separate.”. 
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resort” is a liquidity support to a solvent firm that can provide good guarantees, but cannot receive 
credit from the market because the latter is not able to properly assess the situation. It is a form of 
public intervention grants, as in the case of other bail-outs. This tool, acknowledged among the 
functions of central banks since the end of the eighteenth century, as described in Lombard Street 
by W. Bagehot, is not mentioned in the regulatory provisions examined. Until the recent financial 
crisis it was exercised by national central banks in the absence of explicit European provisions 
(Broyer & Lenmangne, 2013; Darvas & Merler, 2013). The ELA is a tool to prevent the difficulties 
of an intermediary from leading to its default and, in certain circumstances, generating a domino 
effect. The silence of laws regarding this task carried out by central banks is justified to preserve the 
“constructive ambiguity” necessary to limit moral hazard by intermediaries. The discretion of 
central banks using this tool prevents intermediaries relying on liquid facilities increasing the risk 
appetite. Only few years ago, the lender of last resort was explicitly acknowledged in the Italian 
legislation (Law of 9 October 2008, no. 155). In the European context, ELA is mentioned in the 
European Commission’s decisions in the field of state aid. The lender of last resort is compatible 
with state aid rules if certain conditions are met (European Commission Communication of 25 
October 2008): funding must not be part of a wider package of state aid; the intermediary must be 
solvent, according to the evaluation of supervisory authorities; funding must be fully guaranteed by 
appropriate assets; the interest rate should be penalising; the decision is taken by the central bank; 
there is not a guarantee of the state. 
Until now, as noted by the ECB itself,11 competent exercise of this power has remained at the 
national level, because of its close connection with the supervisory function attributed to the 
national central bank of the state where the bank is incorporated. Considering ELA as a key 
component of the system of safety net banking and its close connection with the supervisory 
function (Gorton & Metrick, 2013), we have to conclude that this power should be exercised by the 
ECB for banks participating in the SSM (De Grauwe, 2013). The proposal for a directive on 
recovery and resolution of credit institutions confirms that ELA from a central bank to a troubled 
bank is not a resolution measure; ELA is one of the tools that authorities could adopt when a bank is 
solvent (Proposal for a directive establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit 
institutions and investment firms, recital 24 and Article 5(3)). 
However, it is very likely that as long as there is no agreement on how to allocate the burden 
of banking crises in Europe it will be hard to find a solution to the problem of which authority 
should offer the ELA. 
 
                                                
11 ECB, Annual Report, 1999, p. 102. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
The project of the SSM was developed within a few months to set up a tool to deal with the 
adverse consequences of the vicious circle between the tensions in the market for public debt and 
the fragility of some European banks. As often happens when reaching a political compromise 
among countries with different national interests and various cultural approaches, the solutions 
show difficulties of implementation. We highlighted three major problems. First, there are possible 
inconsistencies in applying the new rules resulting from the presence of multiple authorities with 
different tasks. Second, the supervisory function is split into distinct tasks: the regulatory activity 
and the oversight activity, assigning the responsibility for each of them to different authorities. 
Third, there are some ambiguities in the legal framework having regard to the early intervention 
measures.  
To limit the negative consequences of the plurality of authorities we believe that it is 
necessary to assign a strong role of coordination to one of them; the most suitable being the EBA. 
In order to avoid the supervisory tasks of the ECB failing to work properly due to the lack of 
regulatory powers, it is necessary to clarify that within the supervisory responsibility of this 
authority is included the definition of regulatory standards. Having regard to the third problem, we 
think that it is very important for the ECB to play a crucial role in the early intervention phase. 
The inconsistencies in the architecture of the new system could be overcome by assigning 
broad and discretionary powers to the institutions entrusted with the supervisory tasks, as we 
learned from the history of central banks (Giannini, 2004/2011). According to general theory 
(Romano, 1918), a legal system is not the outcome of just the will of the legislator, but most of the 
institutional apparatus and instruments that ensure the implementation of rules. The SSM, despite 
all the weaknesses identified, could strongly contribute to financial stability, if the supervisor has 
appropriate powers to reassure markets. 
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